Evolutionary psychology: A how-to guide by Lewis D.M.S. et al.
Evolutionary Psychology: A How-To Guide
David M. G. Lewis
The University of Texas at Austin and Bilkent University
Laith Al-Shawaf
Bilkent University and Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin,
Germany
Daniel Conroy-Beam, Kelly Asao, and David M. Buss
The University of Texas at Austin
Researchers in the social and behavioral sciences are increasingly using evolutionary insights
to test novel hypotheses about human psychology. Because evolutionary perspectives are
relatively new to psychology and most researchers do not receive formal training in this
endeavor, there remains ambiguity about “best practices” for implementing evolutionary
principles. This article provides researchers with a practical guide for using evolutionary
perspectives in their research programs and for avoiding common pitfalls in doing so. We
outline essential elements of an evolutionarily informed research program at 3 central phases:
(a) generating testable hypotheses, (b) testing empirical predictions, and (c) interpreting
results. We elaborate key conceptual tools, including task analysis, psychological mecha-
nisms, design features, universality, and cost-benefit analysis. Researchers can use these tools
to generate hypotheses about universal psychological mechanisms, social and cultural inputs
that amplify or attenuate the activation of these mechanisms, and cross-culturally variable
behavior that these mechanisms can produce. We hope that this guide inspires theoretically
and methodologically rigorous research that more cogently integrates knowledge from the
psychological and life sciences.
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Theories in evolutionary psychology are commonly viewed
with greater skepticism than more traditional psychological
theories. These considerations, coupled with the fact that it is
essential to be intellectually persuasive to succeed in the
scientific environment, might tempt the pragmatic scientist to
play it safe—to avoid dabbling in multilevel theories that
specify models of historical origins. Giving in to this tempta-
tion, however, would surely have unhealthy consequences for
the advancement of psychological science.
—Conway and Schaller (2002, p. 160)
In recent years, behavioral scientists from diverse back-
grounds have shown increased interest in evolutionary
perspectives. This rise in evolutionary thinking reflects a
growing interest across the psychological and behavioral
sciences in understanding the influence of selection and
other evolutionary forces on human psychology. This is
evidenced by greater emphasis on evolutionary theories in
leading handbooks of personality psychology (Buss, 2009;
Buss & Penke, 2015) and social psychology (Buss & Ken-
rick, 1998; Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2010), special
issues dedicated to an evolutionary approach to the psycho-
logical sciences (e.g., Gangestad & Tybur, 2016), edited
volumes and social psychology textbooks integrating evo-
lutionary principles (Schaller, Simpson, & Kenrick, 2006;
Simpson & Kenrick, 1997), and the publication of more
evolutionarily oriented introductory psychology textbooks
(e.g., Gray, 2010).
Despite mounting scientific interest, ambiguity persists
about the application of evolutionary psychological princi-
ples. There are several sources of conceptual confusion that
may be particularly important. First, ironically, there is
evidence that humans possess evolved cognitive mecha-
nisms that impede an accurate understanding of the logic of
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evolutionary theory (Legare, Lane, & Evans, 2013; Shtul-
man & Schulz, 2008). Second, technical principles of evo-
lutionary theory appear deceptively simple at first glance,
but in fact require mastery of a formidable body of key
concepts. The combination of these two obstacles suggests
that more rigorous training in evolutionary theory is neces-
sary to properly conduct research consistent with evolution-
ary principles. However, most psychologists receive little or
no such training. To our knowledge, no psychology gradu-
ate program in the United States requires even a single
course in evolutionary biology. Collectively, these issues
point toward the utility of an accessible, systematic guide
that researchers can use to generate and test evolutionary
psychological hypotheses.
The Stages of Research
As with all psychological research, evolutionarily in-
formed research involves (a) generating hypotheses, (b)
empirically testing predictions based on those hypotheses,
and (c) interpreting study results. However, research that
seeks to be consistent with evolutionary principles must also
incorporate several additional features at each stage of re-
search. We organize this article around these distinct phases
of research, outlining the elements that well-designed evo-
lutionary research must share with all well-designed psy-
chological research, as well as detailing key features unique
to an evolutionary approach.
First, however, we discuss the hierarchical structure of
evolutionary psychology, because this structure entails sev-
eral key concepts that are a necessary foundation for prop-
erly applying evolutionary principles at the distinct phases
of research.
The Hierarchical Theoretical Structure of
Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary theory provides a framework for under-
standing the distal causal processes responsible for creating
functionally organized organic mechanisms, such as those
of the human brain and mind. However, it is not a psycho-
logical theory itself. Rather, it can be used to produce
“middle-level theories” (Buss, 1995) from which specific
hypotheses can be generated. These hypotheses, in turn, can
be used to generate specific testable empirical predictions
about the mind’s information-processing mechanisms and
the behavioral outputs that they produce.
From Evolutionary Theory to
Middle-Level Theories
The central principle of natural selection is that, over
time, genes that more successfully promote their own rep-
lication increase in frequency relative to competing genetic
variants. When this core principle is applied to specific
domains of life, such as mating, parenting, or other kin
relationships, it yields middle-level theories.
For example, the middle-level theory of kin selection
(Hamilton, 1964) is an extension of the core principle of
selection to the context of altruism among kin. The key
insight of kin selection theory is that a gene can increase its
own replicative success through direct reproduction, but
also by promoting the reproduction of other bodies likely to
carry copies of itself. Because genetic relatives carry copies
of one’s genes, the preconditions necessary for the evolution
of altruism can be met if this altruism is directed toward
one’s genetic relatives. Hamilton (1964) generated the
middle-level theory of kin selection by applying the central
evolutionary principle of selection to the domain of altruism
and kin relationships.
From Middle-Level Theories to
Specific Hypotheses
Researchers can use middle-level theories such as kin
selection to generate multiple hypotheses. Kin selection
theory specifies that altruistic behavior can be favored by
selection if the benefit of that behavior to the target (B),
weighted by the genetic relatedness between altruist and
target (r), is greater than the cost of the behavior to the
altruist (C; Hamilton, 1964). Formally, this is given as
rB  C.
This formula illustrates that the degree of genetic relat-
edness between two individuals is an important determinant
of whether a given situation meets the rB  C criterion.
Identifying kin of differing degrees of genetic relatedness
would thus have been an important adaptive problem. This
reasoning leads to the kin recognition hypothesis: that se-
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designed to estimate the degree of relatedness between self
and target (e.g., DeBruine, 2002; Lieberman, Tooby, &
Cosmides, 2003, 2007).
Researchers can then use this broad hypothesis, which is
based on the middle-level theory of kin selection, to gener-
ate more specific hypotheses. For example, the broad kin
recognition hypothesis has led to numerous specific hypoth-
eses about the mechanisms by which humans might have
evolved to detect kin. In the case of detecting siblings,
researchers have proposed several classes of cues recur-
rently linked to genetic siblingship in ancestral conditions.
These include (a) environmental cues such as physical prox-
imity (e.g., cohabitation), (b) social cues such as observing
a neonate nursing from one’s own mother (i.e., maternal
perinatal association [MPA]), (c) linguistic cues such as
those embedded in kin classification systems, and (d) phe-
notypic cues such as physical resemblance. Each of these
four proposed classes of cues represents a distinct hypoth-
esis about evolved sibling recognition mechanisms.
From Hypotheses to Predictions
Researchers can then use hypotheses to generate testable
empirical predictions. For example, Lieberman et al. (2003,
2007) hypothesized that humans’ sibling detection mecha-
nisms are designed to (a) produce elevated estimates of
relatedness when one observes a newborn nursing from
one’s own mother, and (b) in the absence of the MPA cue,
increase estimates of relatedness as a function of cohabita-
tion. Lieberman et al. hypothesized that these elevated es-
timates of relatedness, in turn, lead to greater altruistic
motivation. Based on these hypotheses, Lieberman and col-
leagues advanced the following testable predictions: (a)
older siblings will exhibit greater altruism toward younger
siblings if they have observed them nursing from their own
mother, (b) older siblings who have not observed such
nursing will exhibit greater altruism toward younger sib-
lings with whom they have cohabited longer, and (c)
younger siblings will exhibit greater altruism toward sib-
lings with whom they have cohabited longer.
These predictions were generated based on specific hy-
potheses, which in turn were inspired by the middle-level
theory of kin selection, which was itself generated on the
basis of evolutionary theory. A key implication of the hier-
archical theoretical structure of evolutionary psychology is
that the application of a simple insight at a broad level—
such as that of a middle-level theory like kin selection—can
yield rich and diverse downstream hypotheses and a priori
predictions readily testable in empirical research. Middle-
level evolutionary theories guide the generation of hypoth-
eses unlikely to be produced in their absence, and have great
heuristic value for discovering novel psychological phe-
nomena (Table 1; see also Buss, 2015).
Hypothesis Generation
Like all scientific research, evolutionary psychological
research may be theory-driven or observation-driven. A
theory-driven “top-down” approach often entails identifying
ancestral conditions that would have impacted individuals’
survival or reproduction, and then describing psychological
mechanisms capable, in principle, of solving the problems
posed by those conditions. This contrasts with a “bottom-
up” approach, in which a researcher begins by observing a
phenomenon, and then generates testable hypotheses about
the psychological mechanisms that could be responsible for
producing the observed phenomenon (Buss, 1995).
Theory-Driven, Top-Down Approach
A top-down approach involves two steps. First, a re-
searcher identifies a specific survival- or reproduction-
related problem present in ancestral human environments
(see the “Knowledge about ancestral environments” sec-
tion). Second, the researcher articulates the specific psycho-
logical equipment that could, in principle, have helped solve
that adaptive problem. This includes sensory, perceptual,
and physiological systems that detect cues to the problem
(inputs); computational machinery that processes these cues
(algorithms); and behaviors, emotions, and cognitions mo-
bilized by these computations in order to solve the relevant
problem (outputs).
Step 1: Identify an adaptive problem. Adaptive prob-
lems refer to conditions that would have had a recurrent
impact on ancestral humans’ survival or reproduction
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span many domains: avoiding predators, resisting infection,
negotiating status hierarchies, attracting a mate, preventing
infidelity, protecting offspring, seeking retribution, finding
nutritious food, managing one’s reputation, and many more.
Solving these problems may have (a) been necessary for
survival or reproduction; (b) not been strictly necessary
for survival and reproduction, but removed an impediment
to survival or reproduction; or (c) afforded a more effective
or economical means of improving survival or reproduction
relative to other existing alternatives. All adaptive problems
share the following key feature: The genes of the individ-
uals who solved that problem had greater replicative success
than the genes of those who did not solve that problem. A
critical first step in a top-down approach is thus to identify
an adaptive problem—a task for which psychological re-
searchers have multiple tools at their disposal.
Knowledge about ancestral environments. Despite our
necessarily incomplete knowledge of ancestral environ-
ments, well-established data from disciplines such as an-
thropology, geology, primatology, and biology—as well as
the fact that physical laws are unchanging (Tooby & Cos-
mides, 1992)—enable us to know a great deal about human
ancestral environments. For instance, the structure and dis-
tribution of tools and fossilized bones provide insight into
ancestral locomotion, social structures, and diet (Harcourt-
Smith & Aiello, 2004; Richmond & Strait, 2000). Samples
of ancient soils and geological data offer information about
ancestral climates (e.g., Vieites, Nieto-Román, & Wake,
2009). Research on the etiology of disease reveals ancestral
infectious threats (Williams & Nesse, 1991). We know that
ancestral humans walked upright, lived in small groups,
were omnivorous, reproduced sexually, used tools, and
learned skills and norms from group members, and that
women gestated and lactated but men did not. As Tooby
and Cosmides (2005) point out:
It is certain that our ancestors, like other Old World primates,
nursed; had two sexes; chose mates; had color vision cali-
brated to the spectral properties of sunlight; lived in a biotic
environment with predatory cats, venomous snakes, and spi-
ders; were predated on; bled when wounded; were incapaci-
tated from injuries; were vulnerable to a large variety of
parasites and pathogens; and had deleterious recessives ren-
dering them subject to inbreeding depression if they mated
with siblings. (pp. 23–24)
Each of these facts embodies key information about the
evolution of our species because each influenced human
survival and reproduction. Consequently, researchers have
used these observations to generate hypotheses about the
human mind’s evolved information-processing programs.
Psychologists interested in pursuing evolutionarily in-
formed research programs can harvest “low-hanging fruit”
by identifying even seemingly mundane adaptive problems
faced by ancestral humans.
Applying middle-level theories to ancestral human
conditions. Only a subset of the conditions that ancestral
humans faced actually posed adaptive problems. Identifying
this subset is facilitated by middle-level theories, which
specify the criteria that enhance survival or reproduction in
different domains of life. Middle-level theories reveal adap-
tive problems by describing the specific ways in which
ancestral conditions impacted survival and reproductive
success.
The middle-level theory of parental investment, for ex-
ample, specifies the conditions influencing the relative suc-
cess of different mating strategies. Under conditions in
which offspring production requires little investment, being
less choosy about one’s mates and mating with a larger
number of partners can pay greater reproductive dividends
than being comparatively more discriminating. Conversely,
when substantial investment is required to produce off-
spring, the costs of injudicious mating decisions increase.
Under these conditions, it is more reproductively beneficial
to be more selective and to more carefully allocate one’s
limited reproductive resources (Trivers, 1972).
In humans, men and women differ considerably in the
minimum parental investment required to successfully pro-
duce and rear offspring. Women alone gestate, give birth,
and lactate, making the minimum parental investment
higher for women than for men. Consequently, injudicious
mating decisions are typically more costly for women than
for men. Ensuring the suitability of a mating partner is
therefore a more pressing adaptive problem for women.
This application of parental investment theory to recur-
rent ancestral conditions—in this case, sex differences in
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ment—illustrates that middle-level theories help identify
important adaptive problems. Indeed, one of the most pow-
erful benefits of an evolutionary perspective is its heuristic
value in leading researchers to new insights in domains once
regarded as familiar.
Useful heuristics for identifying specific adaptive
problems. Even with the help of middle-level theories, the
space of potential adaptive problems is large and the task of
identifying a specific adaptive problem can be daunting.
Here, we introduce three categorization heuristics that can
be used to carve up the space of potential adaptive problems
and aid in this task.
Must-solve versus beneficial. This heuristic describes a
useful distinction between (a) problems that the organism
must solve in order to survive and reproduce, and (b)
problems that did not necessarily have to be solved, but
whose solution would nonetheless have increased the orga-
nism’s fitness (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
The must-solve category reflects those problems that, if
not solved, would have single-handedly resulted in the
organism failing to survive and reproduce. This category
includes the most immediately obvious problems such as
locating and securing nutritious, nontoxic food to eat;
avoiding predators; avoiding lethal infectious diseases; and
finding, attracting, and successfully reproducing with a fer-
tile mate.
The beneficial category may be less immediately obvious.
Examples of problems in this category include detecting the
compatibility of a potential mate’s immune system with
one’s own; preventing and detecting infidelity in romantic
relationships; cooperating with kin and nonkin for mutual
benefit; and rejecting, ostracizing, or punishing individuals
who steal, free-ride, or exploit others. Within this category,
useful classes of problems for researchers to think about
include (a) improving the performance of an extant adaptive
solution (e.g., increasing visual acuity in an already func-
tional visual system); (b) increasing the economy of an
existing adaptation, such as by decreasing its costs (e.g.,
downregulating the production of testosterone when the
benefits of this hormone are exceeded by its immune-
compromising costs); (c) increasing the reliability of the
development of an adaptation (i.e., rendering an adaptation
less susceptible to environmental perturbations during on-
togeny); (d) increasing the number of cues that the adapta-
tion takes as input (e.g., “decrease in display or quality of
physical affection” and “reluctance to disclose how personal
time is spent” as distinct cues to one’s mate’s infidelity;
Shackelford & Buss, 1997); and (e) increasing and diversi-
fying the repertoire of outputs that an adaptation can pro-
duce to improve the functional match between behavior and
the specific cause of the problem (e.g., different behavioral
responses, such as mate vigilance vs. derogation of intra-
sexual rivals, in response to different cues to the threat of
one’s mate’s infidelity; Buss, 1988).
The value of the must-solve versus beneficial heuristic is
to aid researchers in developing psychological hypotheses
by reminding them of the vast space of adaptive problems,
including those that are less obvious—but not necessarily
less important—in driving the evolution of psychological
adaptations.
How can a researcher employ this heuristic? Consider
aggression in humans, which encompasses adaptive prob-
lems ranging from intrasexual competition and warfare to
protecting kin, mates, and allies. Each of these subdomains
of aggression would have presented ancestral humans with
important adaptive problems.
To use the must-solve versus beneficial heuristic, the
researcher can first ask, What aggression-related problems
must have been solved to enable an ancestral human to
survive and reproduce? This question immediately suggests
one crucial adaptive problem: not falling victim to lethal
aggression. A key first step in solving this adaptive problem
is to identify potential aggressors. To do this, the organism
must detect cues to aggression. Based on this line of rea-
soning alone, the researcher already has generated the hy-
pothesis that humans may have evolved psychological
mechanisms designed to detect probabilistic cues to aggres-
sion. Indeed, a growing body of research suggests that the
human mind is sensitive to such cues, including nonobvious
features such as individuals’ facial width-to-height ratio
(see Carré & McCormick, 2008).
Similarly, the researcher can consider aggression-related
problems that did not strictly need to be solved, but whose
solution would nonetheless have benefitted an organism’s
fitness. For example, competition for social status would
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gressive (even if not nonlethal) strategies. Employing cost–
benefit analyses here can yield nuanced hypotheses about
the design features of the psychological adaptations that
evolved to deal with the adaptive problem of such aggres-
sive conspecifics. Specifically, an aggression researcher
could consider the shifting costs and benefits to the organ-
ism of failing to detect cues to such aggression when (a) the
organism is injured or its ability to physically defend itself
is otherwise impaired, and (b) when the organism is in the
presence of vulnerable kin, or (c) alternatively, in close
proximity to physically formidable kin or allies. A re-
searcher can use this idea—that the costs and benefits of
different responses to aggression would have been context-
dependent—to generate the novel hypothesis that a key
design feature of humans’ psychological adaptations for
dealing with aggressive conspecifics is sensitivity to these
contextual cues.
Threat versus opportunity. A threat is a feature or char-
acteristic of the physical, ecological, or social environment
with the potential to compromise an individual’s survival or
reproduction. These “hostile forces of nature” (Darwin,
1859) include threats from (a) the abiotic environment, such
as droughts or extremes of temperature; (b) other species,
such as predators or parasites; and (c) other humans, includ-
ing hostile out-groups and dangerous rivals from one’s
in-group (Darwin, 1859; Ghiglieri, 2000).
An opportunity, on the other hand, represents a previously
unexploited situation that, if taken advantage of, could
enhance survival or reproduction. For example, at many
stages of human evolution, there were previously unex-
ploited food sources whose procurement required new
forms of cooperation, tool making, or innovations such as
cooking with fire, which can transform previously inedible
items into valuable nutrition, as well as increase ease of
digestion and absorption of nutrients (see Wrangham,
2009). Attending to these “opportunities” can lead to hy-
potheses, predictions, and findings that might otherwise
remain undiscovered.
Which adaptive problems would have driven the evolu-
tion of adaptations? Adaptive problems that generate
strong selective pressures are those that drive the evolution
of adaptations. The strength of an adaptive problem would
have depended on two factors: (a) the magnitude of its
impact on survival or reproduction, and (b) the frequency at
which it was faced. These two factors would have varied
continuously across adaptive problems, but for illustrative
purposes, here we dichotomize them into high versus low
impact and frequent versus infrequent.
High-impact, high-frequency adaptive problems. An adap-
tive problem that was both frequently faced and heavily
impacted fitness, such as the need to eat, would have gen-
erated extraordinarily strong selection pressures. Humans
and other animals have a large repertoire of adaptations that
impel them to seek food, discriminate between nutritious
and non-nutritious food items, and avoid ingesting patho-
genic substances (e.g., Rozin, 1976; Tybur, Lieberman, &
Griskevicius, 2009). And if such substances make it past
this first set of motivational and behavioral filters, humans
have additional defenses designed to expel them (e.g., gag-
ging, nausea, vomiting).
High-frequency, high-impact adaptive problems often
drive the evolution of complex and sophisticated mecha-
nisms. However, adaptive problems do not need to be both
frequently faced and have a large impact on fitness to drive
the evolution of psychological adaptations. Both high-
frequency but low-impact, and low-frequency but high-
impact, adaptive problems can lead to the evolution of
adaptations.
Low-impact, high-frequency adaptive problems. Some
adaptive problems are faced frequently, but each instance
has only a small impact on survival or reproductive success
(Duntley & Buss, 2011). For example, a bite from a com-
mon ectoparasite such as a mite typically results in only a
negligible loss of blood. This adaptive problem is thus low
in its magnitude of fitness impact. However, the prevalence
of ectoparasites in human living conditions suggests that
humans faced this low-impact problem frequently (Rantala,
1999). Consequently, if a genetic variant associated with
increased deterrence of ectoparasites were to arise, it would
offer frequent low-magnitude fitness benefits. Even if the
reproductive success of this gene were only 1% greater than
competing genetic variants, the novel mutation could none-
theless spread throughout the population to the exclusion of
all other genetic variants (Nilsson & Pelger, 1994).
High-impact, low-frequency adaptive problems. Adaptive






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































359EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: A HOW-TO GUIDE
reproduction would also have led to the evolution of psy-
chological adaptations. Even adaptive problems that were
never faced during an individual’s entire lifetime can drive
the evolution of psychological adaptations. We emphasize
this critical, but strongly counterintuitive, point: Adaptive
problems with a large impact on fitness did not need to be
faced by a majority of ancestral individuals in order for all
modern humans to possess psychological adaptations de-
signed to deal with those problems.
To demonstrate how a low-frequency, high-impact adap-
tive problem can lead to the evolution of adaptations, we
used NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999) to conduct a simulation of
the selection pressures generated by the rare, but high-
impact, adaptive problem of homicide (e.g., Buss, 2015). In
our simulation, individuals foraged for finite food resources
that provide the energy necessary for survival and repro-
duction. Once individuals secured sufficient metabolic re-
sources to produce offspring, they reproduced. Overall pop-
ulation size was constrained by a finite food supply and
mortality: Individuals died if they reached a critically low
level of metabolic resources, reached 50 years of age, or
were murdered. For each individual, the likelihood of being
murdered was extraordinarily small: a 0.02% annual likeli-
hood. Murder therefore presented an extremely low-frequency,
but high-magnitude, adaptive problem.
We then introduced a small population of individuals who
were identical to the others except for a single mutation. The
initial population frequency of this mutation was just 1%.
With such a small population, the random force of genetic
drift would usually drive this mutant gene to extinction in
the long run. Indeed, when the mutation conferred no se-
lective advantage, it went extinct in 100% of model runs.
However, when the mutation conferred immunity to mur-
der—and therefore solved this high-impact, low-frequency
adaptive problem—very different outcomes emerged. In
57% of runs, the frequency of the murder-immunity gene
rapidly rose from 1% to over 99% in the population. That
the murder-immunity trait evolved to be species-typical—
present in virtually every member of the population—is
particularly striking because those individuals who were
susceptible to murder faced less than a 1% chance of being
murdered over the course of their entire lifetime.
More than 99% of the population never faced the adaptive
problem of homicide—and yet the antihomicide adaptation
evolved to be present in virtually every member of the
species. This simulation demonstrates a key evolutionary
principle: Even a very rare adaptive problem (e.g., homi-
cide, cuckoldry, attack from a large predator) faced by a
very small subset of the population can lead to the evolution
of an adaptation possessed by all members of the species
(see, e.g., Buss, 2015).
It is worth noting that our simulation demonstrates both
this critical point, as well as the more general utility of
mathematical modeling and simulations in developing evo-
lutionary psychological hypotheses. Complex social and
strategic problems can have many potential solutions de-
pending on the specific environmental and social contexts
that emerge (e.g., see Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). When the
potential solutions to a given adaptive problem are numer-
ous and their relative merits complex, evolutionary end
states may be too difficult to identify intuitively. In such
computationally complex situations, simulations and mod-
eling can be invaluable tools.
Step 2: Propose an adaptation. A researcher’s next
step is to propose a psychological adaptation capable of
solving the relevant problem. Task analysis is a powerful
tool for systematically generating a priori hypotheses. Evo-
lutionary task analysis begins by specifying the relevant end
state—the solution of the adaptive problem—and proceeds
by detailing the specific psychological steps and machinery
(e.g., sensory, perceptual, cognitive, affective, behavioral)
capable, in principle, of producing that end state (Marr,
1982).1
Lieberman et al. (2003, 2007) provide a model example
of an evolutionary task analysis. They reasoned that arriving
at the end states of avoiding incest and directing altruism
toward kin requires detecting cues indicative of kinship,
distinguishing kin from nonkin based on these cues, and
regulating sexual attraction and behavioral altruism accord-
ingly. This task analysis guided research toward previously
unknown (a) cognitive mechanisms that detect cues reliably
correlated with genetic relatedness in ancestral environ-
ments; (b) kinship-estimating algorithms that hierarchically
organize cues, assigning greater priority to those that more
reliably indicated genetic relatedness; (c) affective mecha-
nisms that deter incest and motivate altruism toward kin;
and, at the end of these processes, (d) behavioral outputs
that solve the adaptive problem.
To carry out a task analysis, a researcher should ask this
indispensable question: What psychological machinery and
behavioral outputs would help solve this adaptive problem?
In answering this question, it is important to consider a wide
range of perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
features that, together, could constitute an effective solution
to the adaptive problem. A comprehensive analysis poses
this question at each stage of processing: detecting impor-
tant environmental information (the “input” stage), algorith-
mic processing of those inputs (the “internal computation”
stage), and the thoughts, emotions, physiological responses,
and behaviors that the mechanism produces (the “output”
stage).
1 This process is helpful both for generating hypotheses about psycho-
logical adaptations and for dramatically reducing the possible set of hy-
potheses, because only a sharply delimited subset of features could, in
principle, produce the relevant end state. The researcher therefore can rule
out all hypotheses that fail to produce an end state that successfully solves
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The importance of postulating specific design features.
The psychological equipment and procedures that enable
the solution of the adaptive problem are the adaptation’s
design features. These are the elements of the machinery
whose functional coordination—with each other and with
the environment—enables the organism to solve the adap-
tive problem. Proposing a candidate adaptation entails pro-
posing the specific design features that constitute it.
This task may include (a) identifying the social, cultural,
or other environmental inputs that the mechanism is ex-
pected to process; (b) describing the algorithmic processing
of these inputs (e.g., prioritizing cues with greater predictive
validity; e.g., Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994; Gig-
erenzer, 2008; Lieberman et al., 2007); and (c) predicting
the mechanism’s psychological, physiological, or behav-
ioral outputs. Researchers should then specify as many
precise empirical predictions about observable psychologi-
cal phenomena as possible based on these proposed design
features.
This detailed specification of the psychological machin-
ery is critical for four reasons. First, the specification is
necessary to confirm that the proposed adaptation could
plausibly solve the adaptive problem. Second, predicting
numerous, specific design features enables a researcher to
design studies that test for their existence, and thereby test
for the existence of the adaptation itself. Third, specifying
the psychological processes renders the hypothesized psy-
chological adaptation empirically testable, and, conse-
quently, falsifiable. Fourth, this detailed specification is
necessary in order to submit alternative hypotheses to dis-
criminative tests and adjudicate between them.
Schaller’s, Tybur’s, and others’ work on disease avoid-
ance (e.g., Schaller, Miller, Gervais, Yager, & Chen, 2010;
Tybur et al., 2009) offers an excellent example of research
that specifies multiple design features of a hypothesized
adaptation and tests for their existence. The human disease-
avoidance system consists of perceptual, physiological,
emotional, and behavioral components that are coordinated
to solve the adaptive problem of avoiding infection. These
systems are finely tuned to detect the presence of pathogen
vectors, including feces, bodily effluvia, skin lesions, and
substances with high parasite loads (e.g., dead bodies, rot-
ting meat). The presence of these pathogenic substances
triggers a suite of psychological, physiological, and behav-
ioral changes that reduce the likelihood of infection. These
include the emotion of disgust (e.g., Tybur et al., 2009),
increased production of proinflammatory cytokines as a
proactive immunological defense (Schaller et al., 2010),
avoidant motor responses (Mortensen, Becker, Ackerman,
Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2010), and reduced extraversion and
openness (Mortensen et al., 2010).
Cost–benefit analyses. Two additional programs of re-
search on disgust and disease avoidance illustrate another
useful conceptual tool: cost–benefit analyses for generating
specific predictions about the contexts likely to activate
certain cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. The first ex-
ample comes from Fleischman and Fessler’s (2011) work
on ovulation-based shifts in disease avoidance behavior.
During the luteal phase of the ovulatory cycle, women
experience immunosuppression, rendering them more sus-
ceptible to infection. This higher likelihood of infection
translates to higher costs of being exposed to disease vec-
tors. Because women face these greater infection-related
costs during the luteal phase, Fleischman and Fessler rea-
soned that women should engage in enhanced disease-
avoidance behavior during this phase of the ovulatory cycle.
In support of their hypothesis, Fleischman and Fessler
found that luteal-phase women exhibit elevated levels of a
functionally coordinated suite of cognitions, emotions, and
behaviors associated with reducing exposure to disease vec-
tors.
Similarly, Al-Shawaf and Lewis (2013) employed cost–
benefit analyses to generate novel hypotheses about con-
texts that should up- or downregulate the emotion of dis-
gust. Because stress is a powerful immunosuppressant that
increases the costs of exposure to disease vectors, Al-
Shawaf and Lewis reasoned that elevated levels of stress
should amplify disgust. On the other hand, because hunger
signals nutritional stress, and nutritionally stressed individ-
uals have more to gain from eating, Al-Shawaf and Lewis
predicted and found that satiation is associated with in-
creased disgust.
These programs of research on disgust and disease avoid-
ance illustrate two important ideas. First, by proposing
specific design features, it is possible to discover previously
unknown psychological and behavioral processes that op-
erate in functionally coordinated fashion to solve an adap-
tive problem. Second, by considering the ancestral costs and
benefits (measured in the currency of survival and repro-
ductive success) of different behaviors across different con-
texts, it is possible to generate nuanced a priori predictions
about which contextual variables should amplify or attenu-
ate the activation of the psychological mechanisms under
investigation.
A researcher following the steps outlined here would now
have completed a theoretically driven (top-down) approach
to hypothesis generation. This involved identifying an adap-
tive problem and proposing an adaptation that could have
solved this problem by specifying the proposed mecha-
nism’s design features, including the contexts in which the
mechanism’s activation is likely to be amplified or attenu-
ated.
Observation-Driven, Bottom-Up Approach
The bottom-up approach shares many characteristics with
the top-down approach, including identifying an adaptive
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ever, it includes one additional step: It begins with observ-
ing a phenomenon—psychological, physiological, or behav-
ioral. Observations come from many sources. Some are
readily familiar, such as bipedalism or the formation of
status hierarchies. Others are puzzles requiring explanation,
such as female orgasm (e.g., Ellsworth & Bailey, 2013).
Still others are scientific findings that do not yet have a
compelling scientific explanation—for example, why peo-
ple obey authorities who command them to deliver harmful
electric shocks. And some are unexpected findings not
predicted by any extant theory (e.g., psychological sex
differences are typically larger in cultures with higher gen-
der equality; Guimond et al., 2007; see also Schmitt, 2015).
After observation, scientists conduct a reverse task anal-
ysis, asking what psychological adaptation may be respon-
sible for producing that phenomenon and what adaptive
problem that mechanism may be designed to solve. This
process of reverse engineering carries the researcher to the
beginning of the top-down approach—the identification of
an adaptive problem. Once this adaptive problem has been
proposed, it is essential that the researcher then turn around
and follow the top-down approach to formulate novel, test-
able predictions suggested by the proposed adaptation.
Without turning around and completing the top-down ap-
proach to generate novel, testable predictions, the investi-
gation remains incomplete and the proposed explanation
remains a speculation. In short, generating novel testable
predictions is an integral component of a bottom-up ap-
proach.
Byproduct (incidental effect) explanations. Many
psychological phenomena do not reflect the functional out-
put of psychological adaptations—many phenomena reflect
random noise or the incidental effects of adaptations (Park,
2007; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a, 1990b; Williams, 1966).
Incidental effects, or evolutionary byproducts, represent an-
other valuable conceptual tool that researchers can use when
pursuing an observation-driven, bottom-up approach. By-
products are phenomena that exist because they are intrin-
sically coupled with an adaptation, despite having no func-
tion in and of themselves (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford,
Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a,
1990b). At the level of physiology, the redness of blood is
a byproduct of the presence of iron in hemoglobin, an
adaptation essential for transporting oxygen from the lungs
to the body’s tissues (Symons, 1985). At the level of
morphology, the human belly button is a byproduct of the
umbilical cord, an adaptation that enables a pregnant
woman to transfer nutrients to her fetus (Buss et al., 1998).
Similarly, psychological adaptations may produce function-
less outputs as incidental byproducts of their evolved
information-processing design. An example that illustrates
the utility of considering byproducts of evolved psycholog-
ical mechanisms comes from Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmid-
es’s (2001) work on racial prejudice.
Incidental effects of an evolved psychological mecha-
nism: An empirical example. Racial prejudice poses a
puzzle to evolutionary researchers. The continuously graded
nature of human variation and the limited extent of human
dispersal during ancestral times suggest that it would have
been unlikely for ancestral humans to encounter individuals
of different “races.” Despite an absence of selective pres-
sures favoring the evolution of prejudice along racial lines,
racial prejudice remains one of the great ailments of modern
human society.
Kurzban and colleagues (2001) provide a potential solu-
tion to this puzzle. They propose that race-based prejudices
arise as nonfunctional outputs of adaptations designed to
track coalition or group membership. Ancestrally, out-
groups would have been statistically associated with greater
threat than in-groups. Much like modern hunter-gatherer co-
alitions, ancestral coalitions likely formed for purposes like
hunting, resource pooling, political alliances—and, critically,
intergroup warfare (Tooby & Cosmides, 1988). These im-
portant, fitness-relevant functions of coalitions created the
selective conditions for the evolution of psychological
mechanisms that track cues to membership in such cooper-
ative alliances. Kurzban et al. provide evidence that in
modern environments, these mechanisms lead humans to
mistakenly detect artificial racial “coalitions” on the basis of
small differences in morphology or skin tone. However, this
research also provides powerful empirical evidence that
these adaptations are capable of “erasing race”—they are
capable of producing categorizations that do not discrimi-
nate along racial lines (Kurzban et al., 2001). This offers
just one example—a scientifically and societally valuable
example—of the importance and utility of the concept of
byproduct effects in a bottom-up approach.
Generating Hypotheses: Conceptual Clarifications
The reproduction of the gene, individual, or species?
From an evolutionary perspective, the theoretical focus is on
how adaptive problems impact the survival and reproduc-
tion of genes, not, strictly speaking, of individuals, groups,
or species. Groups and species rarely meet the conditions
necessary for evolution by selection (e.g., Pinker, 2012;
Williams, 1966). In sexually reproducing species such as
humans, individual organisms are extinguished when they
die, but the genes that contribute to the construction of
physiological, morphological, and psychological mecha-
nisms are passed on to subsequent generations.
What does “EEA” refer to? One crucial but consis-
tently mischaracterized concept is that of environment of
evolutionary adaptedness, or EEA (Tooby & Cosmides,
1992). Unfortunately, many researchers—including some
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a specific time and place, such as the African savanna
during the Pleistocene. It does not. Rather, EEA refers to the
set of selective pressures responsible for shaping a given
adaptation (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a).
These are two radically different concepts. The erroneous
characterization makes it sound sensible to discuss just one
EEA. The correct characterization of EEA as the recurrent
set of selection pressures that shaped a particular adaptation
highlights the fact that each adaptation has its own distinct
EEA. There is no single “human EEA.” There is a distinct
EEA for each adaptation.
To illustrate a correctly conceptualized EEA, consider
humans’ psychological aversion toward incest. The EEA of
incest aversion mechanisms refers to the selective pressures
that favored incest-aversion adaptations. These would have
included the need to find a reproductively viable mate,
small-group living in close proximity to genetic relatives,
and severe negative fitness consequences of genetic in-
breeding. This set of conditions is not tied to any particular
physical ecology, and extended well beyond the African
savanna and the Pleistocene.
Hypothesis Generation: Key Points
The reader has now collected a set of conceptual and
methodological tools useful for both observation- and
theory-based hypothesis generation. These tools include (a)
the correct characterization of an adaptation’s EEA, (b)
heuristics for identifying important adaptive problems, (c)
task analysis, and (d) the specification of the design features
that constitute a psychological adaptation and enable it to
solve its relevant adaptive problem. With these tools in
hand, we turn to hypothesis testing.
Testing Evolutionary Psychological Hypotheses
The central evidentiary criterion for testing adaptation
hypotheses is special design —functional design to solve a
specific adaptive problem (see Williams, 1966). Fortu-
nately, in the hypothesis generation stage, the researcher
already proposed psychological design features (sensory,
perceptual, cognitive, affective, behavioral) that are func-
tionally specialized to solve a specific adaptive problem
(Pinker, 2005; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Williams, 1966).
Consequently, appropriate tests of an adaptation hypothesis
do not require special materials, methods, or measures.
Rather, testing an adaptation hypothesis simply entails test-
ing for evidence of these psychological features.
Evolutionary psychological hypotheses posit that “certain
evolutionary pressures led to certain psychological struc-
tures” (Conway & Schaller, 2002, p. 154). Such hypotheses
can be evaluated by testing for evidence of these psycho-
logical structures. This testing can proceed through standard
methods of investigation in psychology, including labora-
tory experiments, questionnaires, cross-cultural compari-
sons, observational techniques, and physiological measures
(Buss, 2015). Some evolutionary researchers employ addi-
tional conceptual and empirical tools not typically in a
psychologist’s toolkit (e.g., paleoarchaeological studies,
phylogenetic analyses, cross-species comparative studies).
However, a researcher without these tools should not be
dissuaded—these additional methods can be useful supple-
ments, but are not strictly necessary. The typical psycholo-
gist’s toolkit is already well equipped to test adaptation
hypotheses.
To illustrate this point, consider human sex differences in
parental investment and variance in reproductive success.
Women shoulder the greater minimum obligatory invest-
ment in offspring (e.g., gestation, childbirth, and nursing;
Trivers, 1972) and thereby incur greater costs from injudi-
cious mating decisions. Moreover, the fitness benefits that
ancestral men would have reaped by mating with multiple
women would have been greater than the benefits to ances-
tral women of mating with multiple men. This has led to the
evolution of choosier and more discriminating mating strat-
egies among women relative to men (Buss, 2003; Trivers,
1972). A variety of different sources and methodologies
demonstrate that
compared to women, men express a greater desire for a variety
of sex partners, let less time elapse before seeking sexual
intercourse, lower their standards dramatically when pursuing
short-term mating, have more sexual fantasies and more fan-
tasies involving a variety of sex partners, experience more
sexual regret over missed sexual opportunities, have a larger
number of extramarital affairs, and visit prostitutes more of-
ten. (Buss, 2012, p. 200)
This collection of findings highlights several key charac-
teristics of hypothesis testing in evolutionary psychology.
First, support for a proposed adaptation comes from empir-
ical evidence of its predicted design features, including
features at multiple levels of psychology, such as motivation
(e.g., desire for sexual variety), cognition (e.g., frequency of
sexual fantasies), emotion (e.g., regret about missed sexual
opportunities), and behavior (e.g., shorter intervals before
pursuit of sexual intercourse, extramarital affairs). Second,
convergent evidence from distinct studies, especially those
employing a variety of methods and doing so across cultures
(e.g., Schmitt, Alcalay, Allensworth, et al., 2003; Schmitt,
Alcalay, Allik, et al., 2003), offers an even stronger test of
an adaptation hypothesis. Third, these methods are already
familiar elements of psychologists’ methodological toolkits.
To provide a powerful test of a hypothesis, researchers
can generate predictions not only about what they expect to
see but also about what they expect not to see. That is, if a
researcher’s hypothesis suggests that a particular informa-
tion processing mechanism should be activated under Con-
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confirmation of both the “positive” and the “negative” pre-
diction constitutes stronger support than merely finding
evidence for the “positive” prediction. Similarly, if a re-
searcher’s hypothesis suggests that a particular psycholog-
ical mechanism will respond to one set of inputs but not
another, a strong test of the hypothesis would involve dem-
onstrating both predicted effects—the mechanism’s re-
sponse to one set of cues and the mechanism’s lack of
response to the other set. More generally, if a researcher
wants to demonstrate that a psychological mechanism or
process is nonrandomly designed to achieve a functional
outcome, one of the strongest demonstrations a re-
searcher can provide is evidence that it responds when it
is expected to and that it also does not respond when it is
expected not to.
In sum, clear, strong tests of adaptation hypotheses do not
require unique methods distinct from those used in the rest
of psychological science.2 Rather, the key in testing adap-
tation hypotheses lies in testing for evidence of the hypoth-
esized mechanism’s design features. Fortunately, these tests
can be readily conducted with methods and measures that
are already a mainstay of psychologists’ methodological
toolkit.
Interpreting Results
Hypothesis testing in evolutionary research is held to the
same standard as that of all sciences: Hypotheses should
be confirmed or disconfirmed based on the degree of fit
between prediction and observation, and the cumulative
weight of evidence across multiple studies. Because an
adaptation hypothesis requires specification of the proposed
mechanism’s design features, evaluating such a hypothesis
requires assessing the fit between the predicted design fea-
tures of the proposed adaptation and empirically observed
psychological phenomena.
Alternative Explanations
All observed findings are open to alternative explana-
tions, including multiple evolutionary explanations that are
in competition with one another. Research on women’s
ovulation-based shifts in mating psychology (e.g., Gang-
estad, Thornhill, & Garver-Apgar, 2005) nicely illustrates
this idea.
The “dual mating strategy hypothesis” (Gangestad et al.,
2005) proposes that women have psychological adaptations
that can motivate them to seek long-term mateships with
men willing to commit to and invest in them, and pursue
short-term mating opportunities with men of high genetic
quality during the fertile phase of the ovulatory cycle.
Research guided by this hypothesis has demonstrated that
(a) women’s preferences for men exhibiting cues to under-
lying genetic quality (e.g., symmetry, masculinity) increase
at ovulation (e.g., Gildersleeve, Haselton, & Fales, 2014),
(b) these shifts are less pronounced among women whose
current mates exhibit high levels of these cues (Pillsworth &
Haselton, 2006), (c) women dress more revealingly at ovu-
lation (Haselton, Mortezaie, Pillsworth, Bleske-Rechek, &
Frederick, 2007), and (d) men’s mate guarding increases
when their partners are ovulating (Haselton & Gangestad,
2006).
This is just a subset of the considerable empirical support
that the dual mating strategy hypothesis has received. How-
ever, there are compelling alternative explanations that
could plausibly account for the extant data. These alterna-
tive evolutionary explanations fall into two classes: alterna-
tive function and incidental byproduct effects.
Alternative function. Researchers should consider
how adaptations other than the one postulated could con-
ceivably solve the adaptive problem, and how an observed
phenomenon might be the output of an adaptation designed
to solve a different adaptive problem than the one under
consideration (Conway & Schaller, 2002).
A viable alternative hypothesis for women’s ovulation-
based shifts in mating psychology is that these shifts reflect
the output of female adaptations to “mate switch” when
their mate value is highest—at peak fertility (Buss & Shack-
elford, 2008). Women desire long-term mates with markers
of robust genetic quality. Because such men are in high
demand, they can be difficult for most women to obtain for
long-term mateships. This idea is central to the logic of both
the dual mating strategy hypothesis and the alternative
mate-switching hypothesis. Where these hypotheses diverge
is in their proposed solutions to this adaptive problem.
The dual mating strategy hypothesis argues that ovulatory
shifts represent an adaptive compromise: Women may, un-
der certain circumstances, pursue long-term mateships with
less genetically robust men, but engage in sexual liaisons
with men of higher genetic quality. Because women’s like-
lihood of conception is highest at ovulation, the benefits of
short-term mating with men of high genetic quality—
namely, conceiving a child who inherits his father’s high
quality genes (Thornhill, Gangestad, & Comer, 1995)—are
also highest at ovulation.
The mate-switching hypothesis, on the other hand, con-
tends that ovulatory shifts are the output of adaptations
designed to lead women to attempt to “trade up” to high-
quality long-term mates. Because women’s mate value is
highest at peak fertility (which occurs near ovulation), the
likelihood of successfully “trading up” is highest at ovula-
tion. The ability of the mate-switching hypothesis to ac-
count for ovulatory shifts in female mating psychology
2 See Confer et al. (2010) for a discussion of why methods and measures
such as identifying specific genes or measuring current reproductive rates
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limits the degree to which these shifts can be interpreted as
discriminative support for the dual mating strategy hypoth-
esis.
This captures two key points. First, theoretically and
methodologically sophisticated evolutionary research must
contend with alternative adaptation hypotheses. Second,
during the hypothesis generation phase, it is crucial to
generate hypotheses about an adaptation’s design features.
It is only when researchers identify and test the divergent
predictions generated from the dual mating strategy and
mate switching hypotheses that they will be able to adjudi-
cate between these alternatives.
Incidental byproduct explanations. Adaptation hy-
potheses and byproduct hypotheses can sometimes account
for the same set of findings. Ovulation-based shifts in fe-
male mating psychology again offer an illustrative example.
Several byproduct hypotheses have been proposed to ac-
count for these ovulatory shifts. Here we focus on one
plausible hypothesis.
Ovarian hormones are reliable indices of female fecundity
(e.g., Sen & Hammes, 2010; Singh, 1993). Estradiol, the
hormone that rises in concentration immediately before and
after ovulation in humans, decreases in many mammalian
species when environmental conditions are too poor for
successful reproduction (Ellison, 1994). It has been pro-
posed that women modulate mating effort as a function of
estradiol levels, as a means of limiting reproductive at-
tempts to contexts likely to be associated with successful
nursing and child rearing (Roney, 2009). The key function
of this proposed adaptation is to increase mating effort
during high-fertility cycles relative to low-fertility cycles—
that is, to modulate mating effort across cycles. However,
because (a) the mechanism takes women’s estradiol levels
as input, and (b) these levels are highest at ovulation within
a given cycle, this adaptation designed to produce between-
cycle shifts may incidentally yield within-cycle shifts, in-
cluding increased attraction to masculine and symmetrical
men at ovulation (Roney, 2009). More broadly, this byprod-
uct account illustrates that processes that evolved to solve
one adaptive problem can sometimes appear quite similar to
processes hypothesized to solve a different adaptive prob-
lem.
Researchers should therefore interpret study results not
only with respect to their own hypothesis and predictions
but also in the context of competing adaptation and byprod-
uct effect hypotheses. Drawing out the specific predictions
expected under each hypothesis enables a researcher to
design studies that more clearly adjudicate between com-
peting hypotheses.
Sociocultural explanations. Imagine that a researcher
finds compelling evidence consistent with an adaptation
explanation for a particular psychological phenomenon.
Does this imply that socialization and culture are unimport-
ant in the development of the phenomenon? Certainly not.
Evolutionary hypotheses are often in competition with an-
other, and they can be in conflict with specific sociocultural
explanations. However, evolutionary hypotheses are not by
default incompatible with sociocultural accounts. Rather,
evolutionary and sociocultural explanations are often logi-
cally compatible with one another.
To see why, consider Tinbergen’s (1963) four categories
of explanations, which apply to any psychological or be-
havioral phenomenon. Two of these fall into the proximate
level of analysis, which deals with the immediate causes of
a behavior or mental process, as well as how it developed
during the individual’s life span. The other two, on the other
hand, fall into the distal level of analysis, which addresses
the distant historical origins of how and why the psycho-
logical structures responsible for producing the behavior or
mental process evolved in the first place. Understanding this
distinction between proximate and distal levels of analysis
is essential for understanding the frequently misunderstood
and mischaracterized relationship between sociocultural and
evolutionary hypotheses.
Sociocultural hypotheses investigate the proximate causes
of psychological phenomena. They valuably contribute to
our understanding of how a psychological mechanism
works in sociocultural context, how it develops during on-
togeny, and what specific social, cultural, and other envi-
ronmental inputs activate the mechanism. Adaptation hy-
potheses, on the other hand, investigate distal causes of a
psychological phenomenon in order to yield predictions
about its proximate causes—understanding why the mech-
anism responsible for the psychological phenomenon
evolved in the first place (distal) furnishes predictions about
how the mechanism operates and what specific inputs trig-
ger its activation (proximate).
Consequently, although sociocultural and evolutionary
explanations can be in conflict, they are not necessarily so.
For an adaptation explanation and a sociocultural explana-
tion to be incompatible, the two explanations must conflict
in the domain in which they overlap: To be in conflict, the
adaptation hypothesis must make predictions about proxi-
mate causes of behavior that do not align with predictions
made by the sociocultural hypothesis. Some evolutionary
and sociocultural hypotheses do advance contradictory
proximate claims, but often they do not. In such cases, they
are perfectly compatible. Determining whether a particular
evolutionary explanation and a particular sociocultural ex-
planation are in conflict thus must be carried out on a
case-by-case basis. The key point is that evolutionary hy-
potheses do not contradict sociocultural hypotheses merely
by being evolutionary in nature.
Gender differences in mating psychology offer an illus-
trative example of the potential compatibility of sociocul-
tural and evolutionary hypotheses, as well as the unfortunate
historical framing of these hypotheses as necessarily in
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a prominent middle-level theory of the evolutionary origins
of gender differences in mating psychology. Central to
sexual strategies theory is the idea that sex differences in
minimum obligatory parental investment linked to sex-
differentiated mammalian reproductive biology would have
created distinct selective pressures on men’s and women’s
mating psychology. A proximate sociocultural explanation
is that cultural expectations about men’s and women’s so-
cial roles yield these gender differences in psychology (e.g.,
originally proposed by Buss & Barnes, 1986; subsequently
presented in modified form by Eagly & Wood, 1999). Sex
differences in minimum obligatory parental investment are
not incompatible with sex-differentiated cultural expecta-
tions. Even more strongly, there are persuasive arguments
that an evolutionary starting point of sex differences in
reproductive biology should lead to gender-specific cultural
norms (see Conway & Schaller, 2002; Schaller, 1997).
Unfortunately, a historical lack of understanding about the
distinction between distal and proximate levels of analy-
sis—and therefore about the potential logical compatibility
of evolutionary and sociocultural hypotheses—has resulted
in evolutionary and sociocultural explanations inaccurately
being presented as necessarily incompatible with one an-
other.
The assumption that a distal statement such as “natural
selection played a part in shaping this mechanism” implies
the proximate statement “social and cultural inputs have no
effect on the development or activation of this mechanism”
is common but erroneous. This error reflects a failure to
distinguish between the proximate and distal levels of anal-
ysis. In fact, evolutionary explanations accord a fundamen-
tal role to social and cultural inputs both during the devel-
opment of psychological mechanisms during ontogeny, and
in the activation of the mechanism in its current sociocul-
tural context (e.g., Confer et al., 2010). Not only are evo-
lutionary and sociocultural explanations often logically
compatible with one another, but their conceptual integra-
tion also bears important potential benefits for the psycho-
logical sciences. By linking models of the contemporary
operation of psychological mechanisms to models of the
historical origins of those mechanisms, researchers can
move toward a more complete and explanatorily powerful
model of human psychology (Conway & Schaller, 2002).
Cultural differences. Cultural differences in behavior
or psychology are sometimes misinterpreted as evidence
against adaptation. Often, the idea of a universal human
nature is erroneously interpreted as implying that specific
behaviors must be universal. Evolutionary reasoning does
not propose this. Rather, the evolutionary psychological
construct of a universal human nature3 refers to species-
typical psychological mechanisms, not universal manifest
behavior (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b).
This proposal of species-typical mechanisms that process
cues from the local environment leads to the expectation of
cross-cultural differences. That is, a universal adaptationist
perspective predicts that systematic variability in social and
cultural input should lead to systematic variability in psy-
chological output. Cultural differences thus represent excit-
ing opportunities to achieve a more comprehensive and
contextualized understanding of psychological mechanisms.
Considering universal mechanisms in tandem with system-
atically variable input is a powerful theoretical tool for
generating a priori predictions about cultural differences in
output behavior.
Gangestad and Buss’s (1993) research illustrates this
point. They hypothesized that because pathogens can cause
morphological perturbations during development, individu-
als living in parasite-dense regions of the world should
place greater importance on physical attractiveness in
mates. Underlying this hypothesis is a cost–benefit analysis
of prioritizing different attributes in potential mates. Select-
ing a mate with the ability to withstand pathogen exposure
without impaired development is beneficial in all environ-
ments. However, selecting such a mate is more pressing in
geographical regions with higher levels of pathogens than in
regions with lower pathogen prevalence. This points to the
hypothesis that humans’ mate preference mechanisms
should upregulate the importance placed on physical attrac-
tiveness in high pathogen-prevalence regions and down-
regulate its importance in regions with lower levels of
pathogens (see Figure 1). Gangestad and Buss tested this
hypothesis across 29 cultures and found that local pathogen
prevalence predicted cultural variation in the importance
placed on mates’ physical attractiveness. As hypothesized,
increased pathogen prevalence predicted greater valuation
of physical attractiveness in potential mates, accounting for
a full 50% of the cultural variation.4
Thus, culturally variable output was not only patterned in
an evolutionarily predictable manner but also predicted, in
advance, on the basis of evolutionary reasoning. This study
illustrates that “evolutionary” is not equivalent to “cross-
culturally invariant,” and represents just one example of the
key idea that culturally variable input into universal psy-
chological mechanisms can lead to culturally variable out-
put. Further, it shows that the application of an evolutionary
perspective to culturally variable socioecological conditions
has the capacity to not only increase our understanding of
cross-cultural diversity but also predict, in advance, previ-
ously unknown cultural differences.
3 For a detailed discussion of evolutionary genetic models, including
both models that posit universal mechanisms as well as adaptation models
that do not posit species-typical mechanisms, see Penke, Denissen, and
Miller (2007).
4 Note that alternative evolutionary models may also account for this
cross-cultural variation. For example, balancing selection—different se-
lection pressures across different environments—could have selected for
different psychological mechanisms in different geographical regions (see
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In summary, we need to know both the evolutionary
function that a mechanism was designed to solve as well as
how the mechanism operates in variable sociocultural con-
texts. These represent distinct levels of analysis, and both
are necessary elements in moving toward a comprehensive
understanding of any psychological phenomenon (Tinber-
gen, 1963).
Developmental explanations. Suppose a researcher
finds evidence of a hypothesized evolved psychological
mechanism in adults. Is that researcher now committed to a
particular developmental trajectory for that mechanism? It
is a common misconception that evolutionary psychological
hypotheses assume narrow developmental trajectories—for
example, that mechanisms are present at birth, static, and
insensitive to environmental input. This could not be further
from the truth (see Confer et al., 2010).
Rather, the developmental process itself is a key focus for
evolutionary psychological hypothesizing. Importantly,
there are multiple compatible evolutionary developmental
(“evo-devo”; e.g., see Arthur, 2002; Müller, 2007; Raff,
2000) models that offer valuable insight into research whose
central topic of investigation is the development of psycho-
logical capacities or processes. For example, some evolu-
tionary developmental models consider how constraints im-
posed by an organism’s life history (e.g., Kaplan &
Gangestad, 2005) should result in developmental shifts in
certain psychological systems and processes. Organisms
have finite energy available to dedicate to processes like
growth, tissue maintenance, immune functioning, and re-
production. Energy dedicated to one process is necessarily
energy that cannot be allocated to another. Researchers can
use such constraints as a conceptual tool for increasing our
understanding of developmental shifts in psychology. For
example, after birth, humans undergo an extended period of
somatic growth and brain development. This developmental
period places great energetic demands on the organism and
requires delaying investment in the development of other
systems. However, after this prepubescent period, many of
the organism’s resources can be directed away from growth
and toward the development of secondary sexual character-
istics, fertile menstrual cycling, and the development of the
psychological systems involved in mating. This evolution-
ary conceptual tool of tradeoffs between the development,
maintenance, and operation of different physiological and
psychological systems has powerful heuristic value for gen-
erating testable predictions about human development.
A distinct but compatible model proposes that certain
developmental shifts in psychology reflect evolved design
features of the mechanisms responsible for those psycho-
logical processes. Underlying this model is the idea that
organisms predictably face different adaptive problems at
different life stages (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2000). For
example, before developing the physical capacities neces-
sary to explore their environment, children are incapable of
Figure 1. Species-typical mechanisms can lead to cross-cultural differences in psychology. Here, species-
typical mechanisms are producing cross-cultural differences in the importance placed on physical attractiveness
in potential mates as a function of local pathogen levels. The hypothesized mechanism takes cues to local
pathogen levels as input and regulates the importance placed on physical attractiveness accordingly. In Culture
3, relative to Culture 1, the mechanism detects higher levels of pathogen-associated cues and up-regulates the
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independently moving and encountering dangerous conspe-
cifics. They therefore do not face this adaptive problem.
Corresponding to the absence of this adaptive problem,
infants generally do not exhibit stranger anxiety before the
age at which they can crawl (see Boyer & Bergstrom, 2011).
Importantly, however, by the time that children begin to
actively explore their environment, they do reliably exhibit
a fear of strangers.5
This conceptual tool of considering the onset of distinct
adaptive problems during development has heuristic utility
for understanding psychological development during other
stages of the life span as well. Successfully attracting a
fertile mate and taking care of infants represent distinct
adaptive problems that men may face in adulthood. The
physiological and psychological systems that help solve one
adaptive problem may not help solve the other. For exam-
ple, elevated levels of testosterone are associated with
greater success in competing for mates (e.g., Gettler, Mc-
Dade, Feranil, & Kuzawa, 2011), but also with inferior
caretaking (Weisman, Zagoory-Sharon, & Feldman, 2014).
A consideration of the shifting adaptive problems that men
face as they transition from competing for mates to being
fathers can be used to generate evolutionarily anchored
hypotheses about the psychological shifts that men may
undergo at this stage in life. Gettler et al. (2011) used this
conceptual tool to hypothesize that men would exhibit ele-
vated levels of testosterone during periods of active com-
petition for mates, but reduced testosterone during father-
hood to facilitate child rearing and caretaking. In support of
this hypothesis, Gettler and colleagues longitudinally dem-
onstrated that (a) higher levels of testosterone predicted an
increased likelihood of mating success and siring offspring,
(b) fatherhood specifically (and not merely aging) was
associated with a reduction in testosterone, and (c) among
fathers, lower levels of testosterone were associated with
greater caretaking. As this research illustrates, evolutionary
models can be used to not only increase our understanding
of psychological shifts during ontogeny but also generate
novel, testable hypotheses about previously undiscovered
facets of humans’ psychological development across the life
span.
These examples represent just a few of the evolutionary
models at the disposal of researchers interested in develop-
ment. Other evolutionary theories model certain develop-
mental trends as a consequence of physical constraints (e.g.,
complex systems simply take time to develop) or as learning
effects (e.g., childhood can be an ideal time to calibrate the
parameters of psychological mechanisms to local condi-
tions). Each of these distinct evolutionary models offers its
own predictive and explanatory utility. These evolutionary
developmental models are often mutually compatible; some
may apply to some psychological mechanisms or some
periods of ontogeny, but not others; and each of them offers
unique value for informing research on psychological de-
velopment.
In sum, a hypothesis about a psychological adaptation
does not commit the researcher to a specific stance about
development. Rather, the developmental trajectory of the
mechanism is an independent question, and one that is
readily open to investigation by evolutionarily minded re-
searchers. Researchers can use the conceptual tools of evo-
lutionary developmental psychology to fruitfully tackle
such important questions.
Null Results: Interpretation at Different Levels of
the Theoretical Hierarchy
Empirical studies can produce null results for many rea-
sons. These include improper conceptualization of con-
structs, faulty operationalization, methodological problems,
or because study hypotheses are incomplete, flawed, or
simply incorrect. In this section, we discuss how a re-
searcher can draw appropriate conclusions about an adap-
tation hypothesis (as well as the middle-level theory that
motivated it) based on null results.
A single adaptive problem can be solved in different
ways, sometimes by very different adaptations. Conse-
quently, a middle-level theory can be used to generate
multiple distinct, competing evolutionary hypotheses about
the adaptation that may have evolved to solve the adaptive
problem in question (Conway & Schaller, 2002). Only one
(or a few) of these can be correct—the set of actual solu-
tions is smaller than the set of possible solutions. As a
result, it is possible for a middle-level theory to be correct,
but for some of the competing hypotheses generated from it
to be false.
The fact that there are often competing evolutionary hy-
potheses means that there is no single hypothesis that can be
regarded as “the” evolutionary hypothesis. Instead, each
hypothesis proposes its own set of design features and leads
to its own set of predictions. The absence of support for a
specific hypothesized adaptation indeed may falsify that
hypothesis, but it does not imply that no psychological
mechanism evolved to solve the relevant adaptive problem.
There is rarely—if ever—a single critical test of a theory.
The evaluation of a theory is a cumulative enterprise that
can only occur through the overall weight of the evidence—
multiple independent verifications or falsifications of the
5 Note that not only does the developmental schedule of this psycholog-
ical process track the appearance of the new adaptive problem during
ontogeny, but once online, the mechanism exhibits high functional speci-
ficity to deal with the relevant adaptive problem. Infanticide occurs in
many primate species (Hrdy, 1977), and evidence from modern humans
suggests that this threat is most pronounced when a child is with a
genetically unrelated male (Daly & Wilson, 1998). The psychological
mechanisms responsible for stranger anxiety carefully track these ancestral
fitness threats; stranger anxiety is generally directed toward unfamiliar,
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hypotheses generated from it (Greenwald & Ronis, 1981;
Laudan, 1977; Quine, 1953). If multiple studies and meth-
ods yield disconfirming evidence for many distinct hypoth-
eses, they cast doubt on that theory. Conversely, if multiple
studies and methods yield confirmatory evidence for many
distinct hypotheses, they provide support for the theory
motivating those hypotheses. Ultimately, a theory should be
evaluated in light of the total body of relevant evidence.
Alternative Evolutionary Approaches to the
Study of Mind and Behavior
The conceptual and methodological tools we present in
this article have been used to great effect in elucidating the
mechanisms of mind and behavior (see Buss, 2016, for a
recent compilation), but by no means do they exhaust the
tools available to evolutionary scientists. Other fruitful evo-
lutionary approaches to the study of the behavioral sciences
include the use of phylogenetic and cross-species analyses
(e.g., Fraley, Brumbaugh, & Marks, 2005; Vonk & Shack-
elford, 2012), as well as the incorporation of principles and
ideas from evolutionary developmental biology, or “evo-
devo” (Raff, 2000; see also Arthur, 2002; Müller, 2007).
Cultural evolutionists employ the tools of cross-cultural
studies and historical analysis to explore interactions be-
tween our evolved psychology and our evolving cultures in
producing behavior (Henrich, 2015). Andrews and col-
leagues (Andrews, Gangestad, & Matthews, 2002) also ad-
vance a particularly interesting approach to testing exapta-
tionist and byproduct hypotheses—an approach that nicely
complements the one we put forward in this article.
Some alternative strategies have been collected in articles
and edited volumes (e.g., Scher & Rauscher, 2003), and the
interested reader is invited to consider these other investi-
gative tools as well. In this article, we have largely focused
on a set of tools that have already proven greatly successful
in their theoretical richness and empirical harvest (see, e.g.,
Buss, 2015), but there is certainly room for conceptual and
methodological pluralism in the application of evolutionary
theory to the behavioral sciences.
Summary
Hypothesis Generation
As in all scientific disciplines, evolutionary psychological
hypothesis generation proceeds via both theory-driven (top-
down) and observation-driven (bottom-up) approaches. In
the theory-driven approach, a researcher identifies an adap-
tive problem and proposes an adaptation that could have
evolved to solve that problem. At this stage, task analysis is
a powerful tool for systematically generating hypotheses
about mechanisms that could, in principle, solve the rele-
vant problem. When proposing such adaptation hypotheses,
researchers should place a special emphasis on proposing
specific design features of the hypothesized mechanism.
Toward this objective, researchers can consider the differ-
ential costs and benefits of the mechanism’s outputs (e.g.,
behaviors) across contexts to generate nuanced hypotheses
about the contextual cues likely to activate or deactivate the
mechanism. Identifying such context-dependent design fea-
tures of the hypothesized mechanism can yield hypotheses
about social, cultural, and other environmental variables
that may influence the mechanism’s activation. Importantly,
this can help researchers generate novel a priori hypotheses
about culturally variable behaviors as the output of species-
typical psychological adaptations.
In the bottom-up approach, a researcher begins by ob-
serving a psychological or behavioral phenomenon, and
then engages in a reverse task analysis to determine what
adaptive problem the psychological mechanism responsible
for producing that phenomenon may have evolved to solve.
The bottom-up approach is completed when—and only
when—the researcher then “turns around” and generates
novel testable predictions based on this hypothesized psy-
chological mechanism.
Hypothesis Testing
Adaptation hypotheses can usually be tested using methods
that are already familiar elements of psychologists’ method-
ological toolkits. The central criterion for testing adaptation
hypotheses is evidence of psychological processes that exhibit
functional design to solve a particular adaptive problem. Test-
ing for evidence of these psychological phenomena can be
accomplished through methods and measures familiar to all
psychological researchers, such as laboratory experiments,
questionnaires and surveys, cross-cultural studies, observa-
tional studies, and physiological data.
Interpretation of Results
Like all scientific hypotheses, evolutionary hypotheses
should be evaluated according to the degree of fit between
prediction and observation. In interpreting study results,
researchers should pay special attention to alternative ex-
planations such as competing adaptation hypotheses and
incidental byproduct hypotheses.
Evolutionary hypotheses are often in competition with one
another, but they are only sometimes in conflict with sociocul-
tural explanations—despite widespread beliefs to the contrary.
Sociocultural explanations typically make claims about the
proximate causes of a psychological phenomenon, whereas
evolutionary hypotheses make claims about both the distal
origins of psychological mechanisms as well as the proximate
causes of the phenomenon. Evolutionary and sociocultural
explanations are only in disagreement when they make con-
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cal phenomenon, and sometimes they do not. As such, evolu-
tionary and sociocultural explanations are often logically
compatible with one another. Importantly, their integration
bears important potential benefits for the psychological sci-
ences. By linking models of the contemporary operation of
psychological mechanisms to models of the distal origins of
those mechanisms, researchers can move away from the mis-
understanding that these models necessarily conflict with one
another and toward a more comprehensive, internally consis-
tent, and explanatorily powerful framework for human psy-
chology (Conway & Schaller, 2002).
Interpreting results in evolutionary psychological re-
search requires two additional caveats: variable output and
multiple instantiations. First, a finding of behavioral vari-
ability across cultures is sometimes taken to automatically
rule out the hypothesis of a universal psychological adap-
tation. This conclusion is unwarranted. An evolutionary
psychological approach emphatically does not predict uni-
versal manifest behavior. Rather, a universal adaptationist
perspective posits species-typical psychological mecha-
nisms. These mechanisms are expected to produce variable
behavioral output in response to the socially, culturally, and
ecologically variable inputs that they process. A rarely
appreciated but critical point is that behavioral differences
across cultures, genders, and individuals may be systemat-
ically predicted a priori based on a consideration of evolu-
tionary psychological principles. Specifically, considering
the costs and benefits of behaviors across different contexts
may shed light on which contextual variables would be
expected to amplify or attenuate the activation of the psy-
chological mechanism under investigation.
Second, there are multiple ways to instantiate a hypothesis or
a middle-level theory. A single hypothesis can be used to
generate multiple distinct predictions, and a single middle-
level theory can be used to generate distinct, even competing,
hypotheses (Buss, 1995; Conway & Schaller, 2002; see also
Al-Shawaf, Conroy-Beam, Asao, & Buss, 2016). For this
reason, it is an error to equate verification or falsification of a
particular prediction with the verification or falsification of the
hypothesis that motivated it. Ultimately, the merit of a hypoth-
esis or middle-level theory should be determined based on the
cumulative body of evidence (Greenwald & Ronis, 1981;
Laudan, 1977; Quine, 1953).
Conclusion
More and more researchers in the psychological and
behavioral sciences are seeking to apply evolutionary psy-
chological principles to their empirical research programs,
thereby contributing to the unification of the social and
behavioral sciences with the rest of the life sciences. How-
ever, because there are many missteps researchers and the-
orists can make, and because psychologists do not receive
formal training in evolutionary principles, it is important to
provide a systematic and accessible guide for incorporating
evolutionary thinking into psychological research. We hope
that this guide will benefit readers and spur novel research
that is theoretically and methodologically rigorous.
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